Latest safety scandal in Japan: Manufacturer Paloma Industries has produced on-demand water heaters (the usual type in housing here in Japan) that have been linked to several carbon monoxide poisonings over the years. You know the script for these things by now, don’t you?
In Act I, we learn of a product defect that has endangered multiple users, perhaps even causing multiple deaths. (This report has the latest figures):
Major appliance maker Paloma Industries Ltd. said Tuesday it found an additional 10 cases of carbon monoxide poisoning caused by its gas-operated water heaters that killed five people.
The company also said four of the total number of cases were caused by the deterioration of safety devices through long years of use.
Cases involving the Nagoya-based company’s heaters increased to 27 from the 17 initially revealed by the industry ministry.
In Act II, the plot thickens as we discover that the company knew about the problem for years:
Paloma Co. apparently knew that fatal carbon monoxide poisoning caused by its instant water heaters, which killed 15 people between 1985 and 2005, was linked to irregular repair work done by a technical arm of the Paloma group, as early as 1988, contrary to its explanation at a press conference Friday that the company first found out about the poisoning problem in 1991.
A letter Paloma sent to its offices around Japan on May 24, 1988, stated that “sporadic problems involving imperfect combustion in our gas devices have been reported lately,” and instructed employees to “never conduct” irregular repairs on the safety devices of heating machines.
The letter, which reveals Paloma knew about the link between CO poisoning and irregular repair work three years before a fatal poisoning occurred in Nagano Prefecture in 1991, was referred to in a Sapporo High Court ruling in February 2002.
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The letter also called on the related offices to “never run short” of safety device replacement stock for the heating machines. The fact that Paloma mentioned inventory shortage in the letter suggests the company was aware that the lack of proper replacement parts had prompted repairers to conduct irregular work on the devices.
In Act III, we learn that action might have been taken earlier if failures to communicate within and among government bodies hadn’t kept information from flowing from those who held it to those who could have done something about it:
Two Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry gas divisions failed to consult with each other on the danger of inappropriate modifications to on-demand water heaters made by Paloma Industries Ltd., despite its predecessor, the International, Trade and Industry Ministry, having issued a brochure warning of the danger of such tampering, it was learned Wednesday.
The ministry created the brochure for liquefied petroleum gas businesses in 1993 after several fatal accidents made clear the possible consequences of such modifications.
According to METI’s Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency’s Liquefied Petroleum Gas Safety Division, which has jurisdiction over liquefied petroleum gas, MITI’s liquefied petroleum gas safety section showed serious concern over a spate of carbon monoxide deaths linked to such modifications in Nara and Kanagawa prefectures in 1991 and 1992.
Upon discovering liquefied petroleum had been used in each of the incidents, MITI commissioned the government-affiliated High Pressure Gas Safety Institute of Japan in Minato Ward, Tokyo, to produce about 50,000 copies of an informational pamphlet on the topic in March 1993.
Exeunt? Well, not quite yet. There’s one death for which the statute of limitations for professional negligence hasn’t expired. It’s being investigated now.